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LAND, INCOME, MOBILITY, AND HOUSING:
THE CASE OF METRO MANILA*
Paul Strassmann and Alistair Blunt_
INTRODUCTION
Few constraints hinder development of housing as much as
exorbitantly priced land, and few cities have land as relatively
expensive and yet abundant as Metro Manila in the Philippines.
High land prices are rarely due to sheer physical lack or high
infrastructure production costs. Land prices rise basically because
of demand generated by urbanizationand the competition for sites
*This article is part of a study of housing and urban development.by the Housing
and Urban Development Council (HUDCC). It was funded th(ough the United
Nations Development Programme and by the Government of the Philippines as
part of the "Formulation and implementation of Housing Policies for the Lowest
Income Groups" (PHI/88/007). Support also came from Human Settlements and
the World Bank. The authors appreciate all the support but affirm that content or
conclusions do not necessarily reflect the view of these organizations.
** Strassmann is Professor of Economics at the Mic.higan State University and
Blunt is Chief Technical Advisor to the UNDP/UNCHS (HABITAT) Philippine Project.
This study was undertaken with the assistance of P,aul Tomas, a Ph,D.
candidate at the Michigan State University. Permission to print was requested from
the journal Urban Studies which is scheduled to publish a version of this article in
1994.
The authors are grateful to Rino Bismark and to Encarnacion Flarallo, Felicitas
Tan, Fe Dyliaco, and Yoly Velez of the Philippine Women's University for organizing
the household survey and subsequent computations, Also generous with their time
and insights were officials of Philippine public and private sector institutions too
many to be enumerated here, Thanks are due to Shlomo Angel, Stephen Mayo
and Thakoor Petsaud of the World Bank for helpful comments.80 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
that agglomeration has made more productive. The less the
subsequent supply response,the moreland prices rise,making idle
lands more attractive to investors.Negligible land taxes and zero
transaction costs willallowownersto behave inthis manner, to hold
land vacant while value keeps accruing. Sales take place slowly
along the shifting demand curveso that little monopoly rent is lost.
The case of Metro Manila in the Philippines is important
because land prices, compared with other prices, have been
exceptionally high and worsening (see land prices, page 97) while
the availability of skilled construction labor, materials, and finance
has been fairly good and improving. Manila can therefore serve as
alaboratory caseofhowextreme pressurefromone variable affects
the allocation of household budgets and housing welfare. Detailed
evidence comemainly from a household survey conducted in June
1991 (see Appendix).
We shall beginwith, first, abrief description of Metro Manilaand
second, a short review of Philippine urban policies. Third is an
examination of household spending on shelter by owners, renters,
and other types of occupants. Fourth, land prices are analyzed by
metropolitan zone and in terms of development costs. Fifth is an
account of residential mobility, or its absence, among sample
households, a good general indicator of the housing markets.
Higher taxes on urban lands are usually recommended to induce
more timely land sales and to finance the installation of associated
infrastructure.Thelastsectionreviewsthe waysuch measures have
fared in the Philippines.
METROPOLITANMANILA
The NationalCapital Region (NCR), an urban zone in west-
centralLuzon,is the political,cultural,and economiccenterof the
Philippines. It is a conglomeration of four cities and the 13
municipalities with7.84 million peopleon636 squarekilometers(as
of 1990).The historicalcenter,Manilaproper,had 20 percentoftheSTRASSMANN AND BLUNT: LAND, INCOME, MOBILITY, AND HOUSING 81
I II I IIII
















LAS LAGUNA DE BAY
PROVINCE OF CAvrrE82 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
population, less than Quezon City to the northeast which had 21
percent.Theother cities,Caloocan and Pasay,as wellas the largest
municipalities, Pasigand Makati,had each lessthan 10 percent. By
1990, perhaps a million peoplelived outside of the NCR in towns
like Bulacan to the north, Antipolo in the east, Bihan to the south,
Bacoor to the southwest, all really part of Metro Manila.
The old City of Manila remains the heart of NCR and the
Philippines with its port, industries, offices, and government
buildings, includingthe MalacaSangPalace along PasigRiver.Here
also isacrowdedChinatownandthe vastregularized and upgraded
squatter settlement, the Tondo Foreshore,Pasay City to thesouth
was the first new zone of residential expansion and is almost
densely populated as Manila city Along itsshore, residential tower
blocksrise next to time-worn restaurantsand entertainment places,
and they overlook clusters of squatter huts colonizing land
reclaimed by the Philippine Estates Authority (PEA). Inland is the
international airport. Industrial activities, however, both large and
small-scale, tended to spread northward from old Manila to
Caloocan. Density ofsettlement ranges from high to sparse in that
direction.
Quezon City,located northeast of old Manila, became the new
capital,a decisionmade duringthe reignofPresident Carlos Gracia
(1957-1961) and involving large and controversial government
purchases of land. While many government agencies actually
moved there, the construction and transfer of the Congress was
delayed. Inaction allowed the spread of an informal settlement at
the site, the National Government Center.Followingthe downfall of
the Marcos regime in 1986, controlover this public land was further
relaxed,and the settlement increased to a size greater than Tondo.
Quezon City leads population, area, and variety of neighborhood
within the NCR.
In the eastern NCR are two expanding municipalities, Makati
and Pasig. Development here is_still heavily influenced by the
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Ortigas and the Ayalas.The patriarch, Don Jose Ayala, became
Secretary of Justice in 1936 in the pre-independence
Commonwealth. He was ex-officio chairman of the Philippine
National Bank,a majorland developmentlender.In 1951, DonJose
Ayala lost in the national election for Presidency to another land
speculator, Carlos Garcia. When Makati emerged as the nation'S
financial center where banks, corporations,and related institutions,
both national and foreign, establishedtheir headquarters, the Ayala
Land Corporation became the prime developer of Makati. Luxury
housing and rental units for office workers can also be found here
with the highest rents and lowestturnover (percentage of dwellings
changing occupants in a year). However,the Asian Development•
Bankand the country's largestcorporation,the San Miguelbrewery
havetheir headquarters in Pasig,a municipality that began with an
industrial orientation but is now rapidly emerging as a commercial
rival of Makati, developing the same combination of office and
commercial development,and high-cost housing.
Large areas of empty land arefound towardthe north in upper
Caloocan, Novaliches, and Quezon City; and toward the south in
Muntinlupa and Taguig. Unpublished data from Metro Manila
Authority Planning Office remain scant and are often extrapolated
from sources like the 1986 Land Use Maps of the Metro Manila
Commission. Although no part of the NCRis zoned for agriculture,
5,453 hectares were recently reported in such use; and 4,948
hectares wereclassifiedas "open land."These expanses were both
private and government owned, but were predominantly
abandoned and lay idle,withsome accessroads and utilities butno
buildings. Included in these figures were watershed areas, but not
the actual waterwaysor reservoirs.The unpublishedestimate isthat
•squatters occupy 10 percent of the land reported either to be in
agricultural use or "open land," leaving about 95 empty square
kilometers available.About 10 percent of lots in built-up residential
areas are vacant and must beadded. This representsan additional
20 to 40 square kilometers. These data based on official but84 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
unpublished data extrapolationsareconsistent with resultsfrom our
1991 survey (see Appendix). If 1.508 million households occupied
an average of 105 sq m of land each, as our 1991 survey
discovered, the total residentialareas (excluding roads, etc.)would
be 158.3square kilometers,a mere 24.9 percent of NCR:In 1983,
Ernesto Mendiola, chief of the Philippine Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission, estimated the residential area as 34.3
percent for NCR, a percentage that includes vacant lots and
circulatory (space for roads, footpaths and planned open space),
and istherefore consistentwith ourestimates.(Mendiola 1983:475).
Both percentages are low comparedwith international averages.
Who controls the empty land? Comprehensive information
about land ownership in Metro Manila remains hard to find despite
an ambitious USAID and World Bank-financed project, the
Philippine Real Property Tax Administration Project (RPTA), to
organize data collection through local government units. Some
orders of magnitude can be inferred, however, from Mendiolas's
report cited above. He reports that 650 contiguous hectares north
of Makati were traced in the early 1980swith 465 owners.Average
areal_eld was 14.13 hectares each, enough for developing over a
thousand housing lots by each owner.In all NCR, most owners of
the idle land has 300 sq m or less, but 44 percent had large tracts,
some with 760,000 sq m, enough for 5,000 lots (Mendiola
1983:475-476). In a survey of one northern subdi-v_n, where
incomes were only 3.5 times the low Metro median (which is also
the poverty level),43 percent of households owned sites or houses
in other subdivisions (Dekker 1992:82). Since most land holdings
were small, the actual number of owners of vacant lots may well
exceeded 100,000 households, more than the influential five
percent of the population.STRASSMANNAND BLUNT:LAND,INCOME,MOBILITY,AND HOUSING 85
A SKETCH OF URBAN POLICIES
Publicinterventions in landandhousingmarketsgobacktothe
early decades of AmericanrulewhenManilahad a mere 329,000
inhabitants.Fora longtime,measureslackedthescopeand focus
needed for effective urban development.Under the Americans,
some traditional thatched nipa houses were demolished in
congested districtsand poorfamilieswere movedto new "sanitary
bardos"or"barriosobreros"withstreets,watermains,anddrainage.
Duringthe Commonwealthperiodof the 1930s, a HomesiteAct
authorizedpublicacquisitionand subdivisionof land for laborers,
butprogramsweretoocostlyforthe targetgroup(Ocampo 1976).




low-incomeemployees.(Angeles 1985:50). From 1947 to 1970,
none of the 17 national development plans actually addressed the
housing sector (Yeh and Laquian 1979:22). In the early 1970s, a
Human Settlement Commission under the Office of the President
began to develop land use for all urban areas. Better housing was
to be promoted with loans from social security funds for the
development of experimental prefabricated housing for the middle
class. Thousands of squatters were resettled in core houses at
Damari_as, Carmona, and other distant areas. In 1976, with World
Bank assistance, a site-and-services program was initiated at
Dagat-Dagatan, north ofTondo.Contraryto their stated aims, none
of these programs had much impact on general land and housing
costs.
In 1978, President Marcosdecreed an UrbanLand Reformwith
provisions for regulating ownership, prices, rents, and land in
Metropolitan Manila. A number of agencies were set up and
consolidated in a Ministry of Human Settlements, under Imelda
Marcos, Governor of Metro Manila, but these did not concern86 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
themselves with the basic problem of undoing the incentives for
keeping land idle, nor was finance provided for inducing land sales
(Mendiola 1983:492). Of the 244 areas for priority development
(APDs), onlyone had vacantland.An important step forward was a
modification of building and urban layout codes for low-cost
housing, Batas Pambansa 220, which allows lower standards and
lots as small as 32 sq m.
In the subsequent government of President Corazon Aquino,
the Ministry of Human Settlement was replaced by a Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). A medium-
term development plan for 1987-1992 made housing a priority,and
substantial progress was made by integrating financial
intermediaries. By mid-1980s, the emphasis was thus less on the
physical and more on strengthening the ability of responsible
institutions to finance housing. Another part of this work was the
RPTA, mentioned earlier and its Real Property Tax Enhancement
Program (CORTEP) that was supposed to improved tax mapping
(identifying untaxed properties), assessments,and collections.The
aim was to identify and to computerize all sites and their values.
Parcels that have previously gone undetected were successfully
identified. But the effort everywhereto tax them, including arrears,
succumbed to political pressures (see land taxes, page 104).When
Mayor Simon of Quezon City tried to raise the tax base .by
quadrupling valuations, the increase was challenged in the courts,
and the mayor was defeated in the election a year later. Even his
quadrupling assessments, however, had remained less than a
fourth of market prices.
In the Philippines, the property tax is assessed and collected
locally,but national legislationnow limitsthe maximum rateon land
to3 percent includingthe 1percentearmarked foreducation.These
percentages have actually been only 0.6 percent and only 0.2
percent of "assessed fair market value." It is possible, however,
where multiple owners claim the same parcel, more than one
payment maybe made to the City Assessor.STRASSMANN AND BLUNT: LAND, INCOME,MOBILITY,AND HOUSING 87
To keep tax records up-to-date, surveyors, sellers, and buyers
are all supposed to notify the tax authorities, but such is not
•enforced. In Pasay,for example, Dillingerfound that the registrar of
deeds had never provided the local tax agency with the names of
real estate buyers although these two agencies have their offices
across the hall fromone another (Dillinger 1991:22). Philippine title
records were organized by date of issue, hence assessors find it
hard to locate by simply knowingthe locationof a specific property.
The RPTA program raided identification and assessment by
shifting to map-based inventories from owner-declarations.
Valuations rose by about 20 percent dueto the inclusion of missing
plots and by another 20 percent due to more accurate information
about known plots. Political pressures soon forced the national
government to intervene, however, and assessments were •
compelled to lag from one to five years behind current market
values.With inflation at around 15 percent, the net effect was that
reform raised collections by only 1.1 percent. Local officials, .•
according to Dillinger, "refrained from any provocative collection
enforcement, allowing average collection rates to drop below 50
percent" (Dillinger 1992:41). A 1991 law, RA 7160, mandates
reassessment everythree years.
As population, incomeand both foreignand national investment
grew, land prices continued to escalate as well, making standard
dwellings and sites unaffordable for more and more households
(see p. 97). The difficulty is partly due to obstacles in converting
peripheral farm •lands to urban use in accordance with the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law(RA 6675 of 1988).In 1992,
the Philippine Congress passed an Urban Development and
Housing Act that called for the "equitable utilization of residential
lands ... not merely on the basis of market forces" (RA 7279,
Congress of the Philippines, 1992, page 2, section 2 [h]).The act
primarilyseeks to provideland and housingforthe poorand isnot a
general reform of land and housing markets. Nevertheless, a
section calls for the expropriation (with compensation at market88 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
prices)of public domain ofallunimprovedsites exceeding 300 sq m
in highly-urbanized areas and 800 sq m elsewhere. Improvements
haveto be structures worth at leasthalf as much as the land value.
Local governments are supposed to implement these and other
provisions using guidelines to be developed by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board with the advice of the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). The
government of President Fidel Ramos, elected in 1992, has set a
target of helping in the constructionof 1.2milliondwellings by 1998.
INCOMES, PRICES, ANDHOUSING CONDITIONS IN 1991
Housingconditionsin Metro Manila according to the 1991
survey(describedintheAppendix)wereas follows: Three-quarters
of dwellingshad been builtwithoutauthorizationand were very
small.For 84.6 percentof the units,roofsconsistedof galvanized
ironsheets,and 87.2 percenthad wallswhollyor partlymade of
wood. Only 66.5 percent had their own indoor piped water
connectionand 67.1 percenthadtheirownwater-sealedtoilets.In




themediandwellingwas60 sqm,and themedianlotwasjust5 sq
m biggerthanthat.Averagesizeswere84.6 sqm and 105.2 sq m
respectively.In six other East Asian capitals (Beijing, Jakarta,
Bangkok,KualaLumpur,Seoul,and Singapore),floorspace was
only somewhatgreater,68 sqm, butqualitywas much better;for
example,89 percentofunitshad a waterconnection(WorldBank
June 1992:30,94).
The constructioncost per square meter, includingmaterials,
onsite-infrastructure, managementand contractorprofits,of new
median-priced(hencelow-cost)commercialdwellingswas $148 in
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other middle income countries (World Bank 1983:Table 1).Such a
dwelling could, however, be finished in half the time in Manila,
indicating a high productivity in the industry.The square meter cost
of medium cost housing was $213, and high-cost housing (unless
high-rise) was $333. High-rise condominiums cost $611 per sq m
(Real Estate, III, 1,January-February 1983).
Crowded NCR districts meant that the average travel time in
going to work was short-ranging from 26.4 minutes in Caloocan to
37.1 minutes for residents of Makati. Households spent a median
7.0 percent oftheir income fortransportation injeepneys and buses
that typically (77.2 percent) brought workers to their jobs and
students to their school (66.2 percent). Fifteen percent of
households lived in units that were often inaccessible because of
rainy-day flooding or high tides.Housing worth by tenure mode and
income level will be reported after a discussion of tenure.
In 1991, households occupieddwellings in linewith three basic
tenure types, about one-third for each. Clear owners were 32.3
percent renters of house and lot were 39.5 percent, and irregular
occupants were 28.2 percent. "Irregular" is defined as any status
other than standard owner-occupancy or renting through the
market. Irregular are rent-free occupants, present and former
squatters (those with regularized tenure), and owners of the
dwelling units who only rent the land or occupy it rent-free. The
percentage breakdownof tenuretypes can beseen inTables 1and
2.
Some complexities in the actual situation could not be shown.
For example, some renters classified as "regulars" may live on
property rented or held in an "irregular" way by the landlord.
Irregular occupation also included homes along waterways
(esteros), and railwaytracks-- 1.8 percentofhouseholds, according
to the National Housing Authority (NHA). If dwellings along
shorelines, on garbage dumps, in playgrounds, and in parks are
added, such "unacceptable" housing may approach 9 percent of_D
O
Table 1
•INCOME OF OCCUPANTSAND PRICES OF HOUSING BYTYPE OFTENURE:
METRO MANILA, 1991 •
Monthly Income ($) Price of House and Lot'iS)




1.Clear ownersof houseand tot 971 407.3 12.3 296.3 20,882.7 1,196.8 12,963.0
(384.3) ' (37,126.6) ¢_
• • ' " " O
• . (_
2. Renterofhousingunitand lot 1,186 287.6 5.9 '. 248_1 10,351.9 383.3 6,296.3 _o
(202.8) "' (13,168.7) z
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3. Rentfreeoccupants 299 224.6 166.7 9,926.7 676.5 5,925.9 m
(11,593.7) -o I
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4. Irregularowners 547 225.3 7.4 181.5 8,006.2 565.0 5,000.0 • "10
(172.1) (13,034.8)
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b. Rent-freeland 174 241.1 13.6 185.2 9,804.9 790.2 7,407.4 -o
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c. Regularized 84 255.7 20.1 206.5 6,223.4 742.7 4,814.8
(184.2) (6,330.8) r- _>
Z
d. Squatting 139 174.5 12.2 111.1 3,593.9 390.5 2,333.3 P
(143.4) (4,565.4) c)
0
e. Others 20 238.8 40.3 190.4 10,464.5 1,917.4 5,555.6 m
C181.9) (8,646.3)
o
5. Total Sample 3,003 309.0 5.2 237.0 13,313.8 451.5 7,407.4 -- r-
(280.0) (8,646.3) -<
Note: pesoswereconverted toUSdollars withbhe exchange rateof P27=$1. ZZ
0
Source: Surveyof3,003househdds ofMetropolitan ManilacardedoutbyateamfromthePhilippineWomen's University, -r 0





RATIOS OF HOUSING PRICESTO INCOMES OF OCCUPANTSBYTYPE OFTENURE:
METRO MANILA, 199I
Percentage Ratios from Table 1 Ratios from Each
of Price of House and Lot ,Observation








1.Clear owners of house and rot 32.33 4.27 3.65 5.13 0.21 3.37 c
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3. Rent-free occupants 9.96 3.68 2.96 4.61 0.33 3.03 F
(5.67) -o
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4. _rregutar owners 18.22 2.96 2.30 3.52 0.20 2.22
(4.60) m <_
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b. Rent-free land 5.79 3.39 3.33 4.20 0.39 2.56 -4
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c. Regularized 2.80 2.03 1.94 2.65 0.39 1.75
(3.30) o
0




e. Others 0.67 3.65 2.43 4.68 0.93 2.64 F
(4.21) "_ _-<
_>
5. Total Sample 100.00 3.59 2.60 z £J
3-
Source: Surveyof 3,003 households of MetroMani)acardedoutbya teamfromthe Philippine Women'sUniversity, 0
May 14-July7, 1991. c co
r_ Z
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the stock and serve as one clear indicator of the failure of the
housing system.
Many irregular occupants squatted on vacant land of owners
who were absent or abroad, of retirees who had relocated within
Manila, of disputing claimants, or on unused property of
government agencies. Toughminded "syndicates" often organized
the occupation of such land and distributed sites for a price and
monthly fees.
International comparisonsuggested that the ratio ofthe market
value of housing occupied by clear owners and renters to their
income was not unusual in Metro Manila. Clear owners had
dwellings worth $20,900 (median $13,000), amounts that came to
4.3 (median 3.6) times their annual incomes ($4,888 or $407.3
monthly).This ratiocompareswith 4.1 foran internationalsample of
15 very large citiesin as many countries (Strassmann 1991:765)
and with 4.5 from a 1983survey of Metro Manila(Struyk and Turner
1986). If the ratios are calculated for each household and then
estimated, the median is somewhat lower (3.4) and the mean is
higher (5.1, Table 2). The basis for these estimates are replies to
survey questions like,"Ifonewished to sella house likeyours today,
at what pricedo you believe it could be sold?"
Renters of both house and lot had monthly incomes only 71
percent as high as those of clearowners,$288 (median $248), and
their rents were 15.4 percent (median 13.4 percent) of income (see
Table3).This rentalshare compareswith 16.9percent ofincome for
the international sample of 15 citiescitedabove and with a mean of
16.4 percent for median rent in 50 cities in as many countries
analyzed for the "Housing Indicators Program" (World Bank June
1992:11). Manila renters believedthat the probable market value of
their units averaged $10,400 or 3.0 times their annual incomes
(median 2.1).Thus, the valueof tl_eirpremiseswas only half that of
clearly owned units. Renters seemed to have lower priority for
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Table 3
RENTS, INCOMES, AND RENTAL HOUSING PRICES FOR TENANTS:





1. Monthly income ($) 287.61 5.89 248.15
(202.80)
2. Price of house and lot ($) 10,351,90 383.30 6,296.30
(12,168.68)
3, Monthly rent ($) 44.32 1.02 33,33
(35.20)
4, Rent-to-Income ratio (rows 3/1) 0,154 -- 0,134
5, Rent-to-income ratio 0.175 0,004 0,145
(calculated from each observation,) (0,132)
6. Ratio of house and lot price 3.00 -- 2,11
to annual income (from Table f)
7. Ratio of house and lot price 3.54 0,13 2,22
to annual Income (calculated (4.56)
from each observation)
Note: Pesoswereconverted toUSdollacs wlttt_e exchangerateofP27 =$1.
Source: Responses of 1,186tenantsfroma surveyof3,003households ofMaimManila
cardedoutbyateam from_e Philippine Women'sUniversity, May 14- July7,
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Irregular occupants had still lower monthly incomes of $225 or
78 percent as muchas standardrentersand 55 percent as muchas
clear owners. For irregular owners thevalue of houseand Iotwas
3.0 times their annual•income.the same proportionas estimated by
standard renters.Within this•group,those-who rented the land but
owned their dwellings werein the most expensive premises, worth
$10,900 or 4.3 times their annual incomes.Squatters •reportedthe
lowest values of $3,600 (median $2,300) or 1.7 times their
(annualized) incomesof $174 monthly (median $111). Regularized
squatters had incomes47 percent higher than other squatters and
occupied premises worth73 percent more.Richersquatters lived in
areas that were regularized first. Afterwards, they rapidly improved
their dwellings. Rent-freeoccupants (10 percent of all households)
usually had some special relationto the owners and had premises
(but not.incomes) substantially betterthan those of the irregulars --
dwellings worth $9,900 or 3.6 times their annual incomes.
These levels•ofspending on housing in Manila also appeared
normal and in line with experience elsewhere. For example, the
overall income elasticity of demand was 0.77 percent meaning that
•a,10 percent rise in income wasassociated with 7.76 percent risein
the value of house and lot. The elasticity coefficient is-highly
significant, and the R2 is 0.273. If an allowance is made for
household size and age of the hea_:!!he elasticityfalls onlyslightly
to 0.759. In other words, household size and age are correlated
with income. Household composition and gender of the head are
not statistically significant. _
For the subsample tenants, one can take the logarithm of
monthly rent as the dependent variable and compute an income
elasticity•that is slightly•• lower:0.735 . (The coefficient is highly
significant andthe adjusted R2is.362.)The elasticityhowever, rises
a bit to 0.769 with an allowance for household size. Tenants with
large familiestendto rentsomewhatless housingthan others, given
their income level. They make relatively greater expenditures on
goods andservices than on rent.STRASSMANN AND BLUNT: LAND,' INCOME, MOBILITY, AND HOUSING 97
If the housing market of MetroManilafails to deliver reasonably
adequate shelter, the failure is not obviously reflected in amounts
paid in relationto incomes.Butprices may includean unnecessarily
high share forthe site, allowing less spending for the structure and
amenities. Both high site prices and the absence of security of
tenure can be a reflection of unusual•constraintson the land supply
and infrastructure development, and they could account for the low
and falling mobility of Manila households,•shownon page 101.The
resultis imperfectallocation and improvementof the housing stock
and hindered development of residential construction as an
economic sector.
LAND PRICES
Inhabitants and outside observers havelong considered urban
land prices to be obstinately high in the Philippines. In the 1960s,
Charles Abrams observed that
Neitherthe magnetism of demandforthetemptation of profitcan
persuade thelargerlandowners tomakeuseoftheirholdings orto ..
selltoothers whowill. Thesituation is.most accurate intheenvirons
of Manila,wherelandpoverty exists amidlandplenty (1964:56).
A commoninternational normisthata housinglot area of 100
sq mwillcostas muchasthe GDP percapita.In the 1970s,Orville
Grimesreportedthat itcost2.5 timesas muchin Manilaandfound
the level "incongruouslyhigh" (Grimes 1976:131). By 1990, the
price of new sites on the outskirtsof Metro Manilaat P1,000.or
US$37.00 persq m was 5.2 times as high as nationalper capita
productand 3.65 times as high as the Metro Manila gross city
productperperson.
The median price per square meterof housingsites in Metro
Manilawas P!,540 orUS$57, accordingtooursurvey, The range of
mediansbylocationwentfrom$41.7 per sqm inthe peripheryto98 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
$123.5 persq m in Makati.Accordingto a bulletinof the real estate
industry, however, Makat! prices for sites available in 1991 ranged
from a lowof $444 persq min San LorenzoVillageto ahigh of$896
in Forbes Park, one of the most expensive residential village.The
best commercial sites along Ayala Avenue cost from $2,600 to
$3,700 per sq m (Real Estate Bulletin III, 1, January-FebruarY
!993).
More information comes from a small sample of builders and
developers, who were interviewed as part of the World Bank/
UNCHS Housing Indicators Program. These findings were
confirmed at a 1992 conference of the Real Estate Developers and
Brokers(REDAB).Evena newly-developedsite onthe urban fringe
sold for $37.0 per sq m in 1991.Raw agricultural land near Manila
cost about $2 per sq m, and when zoned for urban development,
roseto a level between $5.5 to$7 per sq m.Laborand materials for
urbanizing the rawsite cost$6 persq m;and another $18 would go
to management, marketing, permits,fees, interest, and others, The
process normally took 3 to 4 years.Total costs were $30 per sq m
and the sale priceof $37 persq m(P1,000)gave aprofit of $7 or 23
pement. The "land development multiplier" was about 20 from
agricultural use and 6.7 fromthe urbanzoned level(37/5.5). Forthe
sample of 45countries includedin the "HousingIndicator Program",
the averageland developmentmultiplierfromurban-zoned land was
4.4 (World Bank June 1992:11,50). For the subsamples of East
Asian and Middle income countries, it was only 2.4 and 3.7
respectively.Developedby vacant land was thus so scarce in Metro
Manilathat newand mostremotesites could be soldfor price about
two-thirds of those estimated for most of the metropolitan area.
Some very distantsites already soldfor$55 persq min 1991, buta
good empty lot in Pasig or Quezon City would have cost $300 to
600 persq m (Real Estate Bulletin III, 1,January-February 1993).
Median prices per lot and per sq m in the major districts of the
metropolitan area can be seen inTable4. Lots weresmallest in old
Manila and Makati and largest in Quezon City and the periphery.STRASSMANN AND BLUNT: LAND, INCOME, MOBILITY, AND HOUSING 99
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Table 4
LAND PRICES BY DISTRICT, METRO MANILA, 1991
1 2 3 4 5
Share of
Mean Median Median Median Land
Lot Size Lot Size Price/Sq m Lot Price in
(Sq m) (Sq m) (US$) (US$) Dwelling
Price
(%)
Manila 64.4 50.0 59.3 2,963 47.1
Caloocan 95.6 75.0 49.4 3,704 48.8
Pasay 83.5 75.0 54.3 4,074 53.7
Quezon City 158.8 100.0 74.1 7,407 57.1
Pasig 87.5 70.0 105.8 2,778 44.1
Makati 47.7 46.0 123.5 5,556 62.5
Other NCR 95.6 60.0 49.4 2,963 51.6
Peripheral 134.1 100,0 41.7 4,167 45.0
All 105.2 65.0 57.0 3,704 50.0
Source: Surveyof3,003 households ofMetroManilacarriedoutbya teamfromthe
Philippine Women'sUniversity, May14-July7, 1991.100 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The combination ofsizeand square meterpricemade lots cheapest
_n Pasig and most expensive in Quezon City.In general, lots were
estimated to be worth as much as annual•household income, from
-about i 9,4 percent less in Pasigto 42.5 percent in Pasay.
Occupants-estimated real estate values are close to prices
;realized in commercial sales but tend to understate the share of
_land.•.Dwellingsare bought as a package from pre_vious occupants
oFfrom developers of large newsubdivisions.The land component
in the price will be understated to hide the markup. In no part of
Metro Manila, however,was the median-share of the lot estimated
as le_s.than .44percent of the value of house and lot, In Makati, it
reached 62.5 percent. Forthe area as a whole, the median.lotwas
worth as muchas the house or 50 percent ofthe combination. This
.,s_re of one-half forthe site compareswith about one-tl_rd for nine
'other middle income countries •(WorldBankJune 1992:98-105).
One large--developerin the Novaliches section of Quezon City
reported-construction costs for rather rudimentary 40:sq m houses
to be$92.6 persq m or$3,704. Ifsuch dwellingswere built on 65sq
m sites costing $2,405 at $37 per sq m,the combined price would
10e,-$6,!09 with 3.94 percent for the site. For unusual charitable •
reasons, the Novaliches builder chose tOcha:rgeonly $1•6.7per sq
m for the sites and kept the land share down to 22.6 percent of
$4,789.50. It is hardly astonishing that, although •profitable, his
developments havethousands of applicants for hundreds of units
before completion. The applicants are screened and are warned
againstreselling. Some havesold, neverthelessat doublethe price,
around $10,000. "But where are they going to live now?" Project•
Director William Reyes,asked rhetorically."What houslng can they
get with that money?"
The medianclearly owned houseand lot, worth$12,963, would
remain beyond the reach of many resellers from Novaliches.But if
they had bought such aunit,they would havemovedinto a structure
substantially inferior to what they.havesold because of higher land
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Novaliches). Of course, they might also have returned to being
tenants, to doubling up,or beingirregularoccupiers, and then have
used the money forother needs.
Without voluntary or official subsidies, private developers of
lowestcost MetroManilasubdivisionscouldhavesoldtheir smallest
40 sq m housing units for$10,500. Nominally,their 65sq m lot cost
$2,400, and construction for40 sq m cost$5,900, making a total of
$8,300 (Real Estate Bulletin _111, 1, January - February 1993).
Hence, there was a further markup of26.5 percent. Much more
would havebrought the dwelling beyondthe $11,900 limit of"social
housing" and qualification for a low-interest (9 to 12 percent) loan
under the government's UnifiedLending Program.But according to
reliable informants, a further 20 percent was often secretly charged
to households wishing to be selected. For three years, they repaid
this unsecured developer-supplied loan at 22 percent interest with
post-dated checks: Only land scarcity and the monopolistic power
of developers can explainsuch behavior.
According to our survey, median owner-occupants were in
dwellingsworth 3.37 timestheir annualincomesof$3,5.56(Tables1
and 2), but median income of all households was only $2,844. The
lowest new commercial dwelling price of $10,500 (if not further
marked up) was 3.69 times that median income, hence it was
unaffordable for the poorest half of the population. In technical
terms, the "down-market penetration of the unsubsidized private
sector" was 50 percent which compares with 80 percent for
Bangkok(World Bank 1993: 15).Needlessto say,poorhouseholds
had to double up, build illegally instead, or find accommodation in
the old housing stock, ring the issue of housing turnover and
residential mobility.
MOBILITY
Manila householdsdo not move easilyfrom one dwellingto
another,implyinglowturnoverorinaccessibility ofthe old housing
stock.Amongsurveyedhouseholds, only6.0 percent had moved102 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
during the previousyear, an immobilitythat isat least abovethat of
East Europe during the Communist era. For example, in the East
German Democratic Republic,it was only2.5 percent in 1980-1981.
In Colombo, Sri Lanka, where government interference with
housing transactions had been drastic, mobility was 5.0 percent in
1981. Major cities in 13 other countries had mobility higher than
Manila, an average mobility of 14.3 percent (11.9 percent) without
Seoul, Korea) (Strassmann 1991:765). In Bangkok during 1980 to
1986, it was 19.2 percent similar to that of urban United States,
while nine Indonesian cities had a mobilityof 8.5 percent. In 1988,
(Struyk et al. 1990).The average mobility in 1991 in large cities of
44 countries included in the "Housing Indicator Program" was 9.0
percent. The subsample of six other East Asian cities (Bangkok,
Beijing, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Seoul, and Singapore) had 13.3
percent mobility (World BankJune 1992:11,36).
A 1983 survey reported a Manilamobility of 7.4 percent (Struyk
and Turner !986), hence it seems that Manila mobility has now
fallen, as may betrue of other citieswith deteriorating housing and
land markets.Surveyresponses indicating that only28.7 percent of
households had occupied their dwellings between one and five
years in Metro Manila in 1991 also imply an average mobility of
about 6 percent annually.
Before analyzing immobility further, one should note its
geographical diversity. Mobility was highest in Caloocan (8.1
percent) and Pasig (7.3 percent), and the lowest in Makati (2.8
percent), Manila (4.2 percent), and the Periphery (4.6 percent).
Quezon City (6.3 percent) and Pasay (5.9 percent) were close to
the MetroManila average of 6.0 percent.In alldistricts, the average
household had occupied its premises from 12 to 14 years, except
for a year less in Caloocan and a year more in the Periphery.
Average length of occupancy was 13 years. The survey did not
distinguish intra-districtmovesfrom others, but atleast, migration is
not going disapproportionately to the Periphery, attracted by
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household is about halfway through its tenure in a dwelling at the
time of a survey, the implication of ten years so far is that the full
tenure will be about 20 years. Without population growth or
demolitions, this duration would have implied a 5 percent rate of
annual turnover.
About half (53.3 percent)of the households surveyed had been
newly formed or had migrated to the metropolitan area, and half
had moved from another dwelling. The latter had occupied the
previous dwelling for an average of 7.1 years (standard error
deviation [s.e.]:0.174; median:5years).Ownershad occupied their
previous unit 8.1 years (s.e.: 0.261; median: 6.0 years). Renters
had occupied theirs dwelling for 6.2 years (s.e: 0.222; mediari: 5.0
years).That isa low rateofmobilityfortenants, butstill70.8 percent
of intra-urban movers had been tenants before. Tenants seemed
three or four times more likely to move than owners or irregular
occupants. Notethat only 10.2 percent oftenants believedthat they
lived in units affected by rent control although two-thirds of units
weretechnically inthat category,meaningmonthly rentswere below
P2,500 (US$92.6).Forcomparablehousing, unitsthat wereactively
controlled had rents only 18.1 percent lower.Rent control seemed
to be a factor with little effect on mobility.
In most developing countries,"to became an owner"isgiven as
the principal reason for moving to the current dwelling. But in
Manila, with its limited access to buildingland, that aim was given
for the present location by only 15 percent of households. Instead,
"housing' was considered a poor bargain, and 55.3 percent of
households hadchosen their presentlocationprimarlly"to pay less."
The only competing motivations were to be "closer to work" (8.5
percent) or having accessto betterfacilities (6.8percent).Only 10.2
percent of current non-owning households had any plans to move
to become owners. Morethan a third of these lived in Quezon City.
Among households that had moved from one Metro Manila
dwelling to another, the average and median numberof moveswas104 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
two.Pastmobilityhadbeen fairlyuniformthroughout the city,though
somewhat higher in Pasay and a bit lower in Makati and the
Periphery.These relocating households had been in existence for
an average of 19.3 years, and 77.0 percent of them moved only
once or twice in that time span. For the relocating households,
access to work and better facilities almost equalled ownership as a
reason for moving.
LANDTAXES AND PUBLIC POLICY
The explanation forthe shelter predicamentof Manila and other
Philippine cities isnotjust that people are poorand cannot afford to
buy much land and housing. Rather, many may be poor precisely
because land prices are high in a way that hinders urban
development and productivity growth. Major inputs for residential
construction, apart form sites, come from finance and the building
industry, and as mentioned before, these are tolerably efficient in
Metro Manila. Skilled construction workers require a premium of
only 40 to 60 percent above the wages of unskilled laborers
(compared with about 100 percent) in other East Asian or middle
income countries). At a cost of $100 to $200 per sq m, low to mid-
cost housing projects of about a hundred units can be builtin three
tosix months,twiceas fast as in sixother EastAsian capitals (World
Bank June 1992:78). The financial system retains elements of
subsidy and repression and isslowin collectionand foreclosure but
high in public sector arrears (26 percent). It is also rather
underdeveloped compared with those of Asian neighbors; but has
been reformed in recent years (World Bank 1990). What mainly
holds back the housing sector,hence much of the urban economy,
is the high land prices, as described above,
The solution for inadequate housing is therefore not merely
assistance for target groups of the urban poor in this or that
neighborhood --althoughthat isbetterthan nothing.The problem is
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prices. If these prices were as low as in comparable developing
countries, and giventhe share of incpmethat Filipinosarespending
for housing, as muchas 50 percent moreshelter could have been
built (a reallocation from the site price), and fewerthan 28 percent
of household would probably live under irregular tenure
arrangements.There would be more mobilityyet less of a problem
ofsquatters and "squattingsyndicates"andless thanthree quarters
of housing would havebeen built in an "authorized"manner.
Another probable negativeconsequence of high and risingland
prices is an effecton saving.Tothe extentthat household wealth of
landowners rises toward higher labels automatically through the
agglomeration and speculative effect on land values, saving
through foregone consumption is less needed. In 1990, gross
domestic savings in the Philippines was 16 percent of GDP,which
compares with 34 percent for Thailand, 33 percent for Malaysia,
and 37 percent for Indonesia (World Bank 1992:234-235).-Price
rises of urban land could explain part of the difference.Whenever
wealth can beaccumulated merelythrough holding urban land, the
pressure forsaving out of income will be less.
Promotional literature of real estate agents in Manila smoothly
plays up this nearly tax-free bonanza: "In real estate, people who
have already made some financial gain can attestto the fact that it
stands head and shoulders aboveany otherform of investments....
The most common types of investmentscompared with real estate
are money market, stockmarket and jewelryI"These are shown to
havereal rates ofreturn of 3.6percent, 7.0 percent, and5.0 percent
respectively,compared with 12.5 percent real-ratesfor holding real
estate. Even adjusted for inflation, the article suggests wealth can
doublein six years.In fiveQuezon City districts,land priceper-sqm
had risen by an average of 15.1 percent from 1991 to 1992. The
readershould "Buypropertieswithas m_chas leverageas possible,
with little or no money down ...And unlike other investment fields,
the realestate marketneverexperiences Pricefluctuations. Instead,
there is a consistent increase in prices.Therefore, if the investment106 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
is not real estate, almost always,the odds and inflation are against
you" (Real Estate Bulletin III, 1January - February 1993:2).
Data from the 1991surveyshowthe consequences ofthe urban
land problems. It benefits quite a few but hurts many others as
reports, both national and international, have also noted. An Asian
Development Bank report (ADB 1989:53) said, "While there is no
overall shortage of land supply in urban areas.., the majority of low
and medium income families cannot afford to pay for residential
land."The Housingand Land Use Regulatory Board (HLRB) lacked
power to implement a coordinated development plan, and even
where two parties agree, "...the legal process associated with land
acquisition are long and tortuous." For the National Housing
Authority, land acquisition had proved a most difficult and time-
consuming task, measured in years, not months."Use was never
made of power to impose an extra tax on idle land and to levy
special assessments.Hence,therewere "nofinancial incentivesfor
owners to develop their idle land since taxes onsuch land are very
low" (ADB 1989:54).
The Philippines haveno restrictionson corporate ownership of
land, on inheritance, or on price when sold. Transactions are
monitored by the courts,the LandTitles and Registration Authority,
and the Bureau of Lands.Allland istherefore registered,but reports
from local registrars of deeds to the Authority do not distinguish
among agricultural, commercial and residential land, and in any
case, reports arenot availabletothe public. Eventhe extent ofclear
versus contested titles is not generally known. An undisclosed but
large fraction of land is owned by government agencies. In some
Philippine municipalities,one can even attribute as much as a third
of the high Land Development multiplier (6.7)to the enervating
costs and delays of dealin_lfor three to four years with a complex
and cumbersome bureaucracy (Blunt 1993).
A widespread (but not unanimous) view of experts on urban
land and public finance is that land price inflation can be brought
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attracting enough hectarage to come voluntarily into the market
through sufficiently high taxation on land that should be urbanized.
The experience of Taiwan has been studied as a successful
application (Lent 1977). Other developing countries with higher
taxes on vacant urbanland areArgentina,Bolivia, Botswana,Brazil,
Chile, Columbia, Cote d'lvoire, Ecuador, Peru, Senegal, Syria,
Tunisia andTurkey (Bahl and Linn 1992:171).
According toYoingco (1988:10-11), the general idle land surtax
has never been collected in the Philippines, as mentioned above,
because of inability to agree on a definition of "idle." In the
Philippines, land taxation of up to local government units that
exempt some tracts and levy lower taxes than what is allowed on
other properties. Assessed values couldbe updated only everyfive
years (now three years) and have laggedseriously behind the rate
of inflation of 14.8 percent forthe 1980s (GDP deflator).
Revised valuations must be authorized and are subject to
challenges in court, but clearnationalstandards do exist.According
to a recent article by Tan,
The most important obstacle to effective implementation of the RPT
... [Real Property Tax, remains]the case-to-case method of valuation,
which makes itphysicallyimpossiblefor localgovernments to achieve
a fair and accurate valuation.The method is also prone to corruption,
since each property owner is given the opportunity to negotiate with
the assessor on the value of the property. This problem, combined
with power politicsat the locallevel,works againstthe implementation
of RPT (1993:169).
The assessor for peripheralAntipolo did raise assessment an
average of 660 percent during 1985-1990 reflecting actual sales
and showing that it could bedone.But infiveMakati neighborhoods,
assessed values in 1992 were only 16.7 percent of the prices of
land advertised commercially(Tan 1993:162-163).ForQuezon City108 '- ".... 'JOURNALOF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and one other municipality in.Metro Manila, the property tax rate
was:2.0 percentassessed Valuethat were !9.3 .percent of market
values in 1991. Thereforel the effective.tax rate-was only 0.386
• .. :. ." , .. ..'. .'.." .'....',
percent.
Low assessment was .aggravated by Shortfalls. in ac-tua!
collection (ADB 1989: 55). The penalty rate forlate payment"(2
percent monthly) was less that the return on alternateinvestment
(Bahl and Linn1992:115). Frommany parcels,taxes were Collected
only at the time of sale.: - • •" ...
As aresultof low tax collection,local .governmentslackedfunds
for building and maintaining roads,.drainage,. and other
infrastructure. Even what-was built was too Costly because of
unnecessarily sporadic low-densitydevelopment.The public sector
lacked .themeans. to "ensure that the location and. phasing, of
infrastructure investment to guide private investmentgoes to low-
cost environmentallysuitable,urban expansion-zones"(ADB 1989:
• [J3):Local governmentslacked funds for building the infrastructure
that would have made more land physically accessible: Low land
taxesfostered holding idle land and forced expensive dispersion in
some areas and congestion in others a vicious circle.
When a socialproblem and itssolution havebeenidentified but
little is donel chances arethat opposinggroups with power believe
action meanstossfortlTemselves.PerhapsRobertWadehad it.right
in The .Economist (April 4; 1992181)t-hat the "unpromising
conditions"..ofthe Philippines-are a case "where the.state elite is
fused withthe business andlanded elites" in ways.that hinder pro-
market intervention. An official close to President:A.quino was
pessimistic about reform because of the strong opposition from
some Congressional leaders,who own.vast urban properties, and
influential landed private Sector individuals" (Business .Star;
'February 21, 1991). The problem, however is not justthat some
families ownvasttractsof land andcannot.bepushedto sell throUgh
appropriate taxe&As statedbef0re,by.now unreported thousands
of middle class Filipinos have put their savings into urban lots andSTRASSMANN ANDBLUNT: LAND,INCOME,MOBILITY, ANDHOUSING 109
make up a strong constituency against substantial and efficient tax
reform; Real estate may be their principal •investment, their only
dependable.hedge against inflation, and their best hope of future
wealth. " •
".-In 1989, Dekker studied •in detail how one private • northern
•subdivision of 725 hectares with 1,390 houses •was organized in
about •two decades. He concluded that, "
The case study of this paper showed that there is little reason for
optimism with regard to Cooperationbythe bureaucracy ...Of crucial-
importance was the large measure of discretion politicians and
officialsenjoyedwith regardto their involvementinthe housingproject
and land distribution.This wide room for manoeuvreresults from the
fact that a strict and clear vision and policy toward the housing
•problembythepublic authoritiesis lacking... Personalismresultsin
the concentration of land in the hands.of those who use land mainly••
for investment purposes; in this way, personalism enhances the
vacancy of relatively scarce land and:with that,it undermines the
functioningof the conventionalland market-(Dekker:90,93).
• . ... ..
" Lower land prices for manycan only be obtained by reducing
expected wealth of others.One may taxsite Value or its betterment,
withdraw development rights, or arrange readjustment 'schemes.
But as Doebele had •noted, most measures •seem to
threateni directly or indirectly," all propertyowners from thelanded.
elite,the risingspeculator, andthe middle-incomeinvestorto the low-
income family for whom land and house•are its greatest economic
Stake:inlife. •Historically, •majortaxation Oracquisition of urban land
has occurredonlyat momentsof revolution " or attimes whenthe
generalpublicoutcryagainstSoaring urbanlandpricesandexorbitant
profit-makingfrom land sales iiave forced governments.to act
(Doebele1983:365), '110 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
In the absence of reforms,Metro Manilais likelyto keep a much
higher land development price markup than estimated in Bangkok,
Hong Kong, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur,Seoul, or Singapore. The city
may remain lowest in urban infrastructure spending per capita and
in access to amenities like piped water.The share of housing built
without title or permits and made of impermanent materials will
remain highest, whilethe annualconstruction of dwelling units of all
types perthousand inhabitantswill nevertheless staylowest among
these seven East Asian capitals (World Bank 1993).Conditions in
provincial cities will reflect the same basic pressure, an
unresponsive land market.
CONCLUSION
The 1991 housing surveyshowedthatMetroManilahouseholds
payanincomefordwellings thatisnohigherthanthesharetypically
paid in othercountries.ButFilipinoshaveless adequatehousing
than mightbe expectedbecauseso muchmoreof this shareof
incomeis usedforpurchaseof the land.In Manila,the lotisworth
as much as or morethan the dwellingitself.Negligibleproperty
taxesonidlelandhavediscouraged timelysalesandhavehindered
the performanceof land markets, housingconstructionand the
consequentturnoverand allocationof the entirehousingstock,A
counterpartoftheseimpairedmarketsisthelowresidential mobility
of households comparedtothoseinothercountries. Anotherresult
is the extent of irregularityand lack of securityof tenure which,
ironically goeswithlowermobility.
It may be that the accelerationof squatting and a fear of
"professional squatting syndicate" has been more effective in
triggeringPhilippineurban reformsthan recognitionof paralyzing
economiceffects.The 1992 Urban Developmentand HousingACt
and a newly-electedadministration are committedto urban land
reforms. As one step, developers are henceforth to provide a
hectare of land for social housing for every four hectares ofSTRASSMANN AND BLUNT:LAND,INCOME,MOBILITY,AND HOUSING 11.1
commercial housing that they develop within any municipality.
Enforcing this, however,isnot easyand does notaddress the basic
problem. It is further moredoubtful that this measure will persuade
the powerful lobby of developers to favor an effective tax and
administrative reform for bringing land to market.
The ADB consultants realizedthat"In the Philippines,as inother
countries, a tax on idle land would be politically sensitive" (ADB
1989:55-56). Reviewing the literature on taxation in developing
countries, Ahmad andStern find the landtax "theoretically superior"
and easy to monitor, but they note that "the rich and powerfulhave
been particularly successful" in blocking it because "resistance to
proper valuation and collection can be fierce and effective."Bahl
and Linn haveobserve thatthere is aclearand dominant trend ...in
the direction of taxing land at a differentially higher rate than
improvements" (1992:100). But going a step further to pure site
value taxation "can be perilousforthe government, possibly alsofor
the economist, and his damage credibility as an advisor" (Ahmad
•and Stern 1989:1074-75, 1078). Meanwhile in the Philippines,
structures and equipment are taxed at ad valoremrates which are
twice, or more as high as residentialland (Tan 1993:156).
A forcefully clearexplanation of the benefits of land taxation to
landowners, developers, and the public depends heavily on
accuratedata, so that one mayconsiderthat achievingbetter record
keeping and transparency from government agencies, as well as
the capability to analyze the local situation using international
indicators, as a promising sign of reform.In May 1993, a "National
Shelter Indicators Roundtable Consultation and Workshop" was
held with high-level representatives from both legislative and
administrative branches ofthe Philippine government.The aim was
to institutionalize better monitoring of the shelter sector in terms of
equity and efficiency.The urban impassein the Philippines, though
extreme, has counterparts in other countries, where, with decades
of experience, we have learned that tax collection becomes
politically acceptable when the link to public services and smoothly
functioning markets is understood.112 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
APPENDIX
Design of the Household Survey
The household survey was carried out in conjunctionwith the
UNCHS/World Bank Housing Indicators study during•the period
May 14to July 7, 1991,by a team from the Philippine Women's•
University under the direction of Ms. Encarnacion Raralio. The
sample was drawnnot onlyfromthe official NationalCapital Region
(NCR) but also from the peripheral settlements beyond NCR
boundaries that has effectivelybecomea part of Metro Manila.This
addition is the urban contiguous area in the provinces of Bulacan,
Laguna, Cavite and Rizal within commuting distance of the NCR.
One respondent forevery600 householdswas to be sampled. With
a population ofsome nine millionand an average household size of
five, the designated sample size was therefore 3,000.
Sampling design and the survey instrument of 58 questions
were submitted to the Philippine National Statistical Coordination
Board for technical reviewand clearance.This stratified, two-stage
sampling design and estimating•procedure was based on the
IntegratedSurveyof Householdsofthe National StatisticsOffice. In
the eight major domains (Manila, Caloocan, Pasay, Quezon City,•
Makati, Pasig, other NCRI and the Periphery), there were 183
subdistricts called barangays. These were the primary sampling
units, and their probability of •selection was determined by the
number of households in each area according to the 1990 Census
of Population and Housing. Households were the secondary
sampling units and were selected from the subsamples of
barangays according to a formula •giving each households in a
major domain an equal probability of selection. The number of
households selected in all primary sampling units represented the
total numberof households within the domain. Lack of an up-to-
date master list of households resulted in the use of barangays
maps and updated lists of residents •preparedby barangay officialsSTRASSMANNAND BLUNT:LAND,INCOME, MOBILITY,AND HOUSING 113
orbythe localhomeownerassociations forthe final selection.Thus,
the choice of households Wasdetermined by a random selection
from structured groupings of barangays, based on the number of
households in each.
After no serious problems were encountered in pre-testing the
questionnaire, eight well-trained interviewers with two supervisors
carried out the field enumeration.The usual editing and verification
processes were carried out to ensure that the final set of 3,003
responseswas complete and reasonable.Computations used the
SPSS PC+ softwarepackage.114 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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